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A BETTER BUYING POWER ANALYSIS OF THE JAVELIN 
PROGRAM 
ABSTRACT 
This research report provides a strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats 
(SWOT) analysis of the Javelin anti-tank weapon system program’s adherence to our 
Better Buying Power (BBP) best practices. This report used the BBP mandates as a 
standard to judge and analyze the Javelin program. The history and development of both 
Javelin and the BBP were thoroughly researched, and the efficacy of the BBP mandates 
was explored by comparison to real-world acquisition. 
It was found that the Javelin program’s internal strength is its highly successful 
implementation of performance-based logistics. An internal weakness is its 
overdependence on large contractors in lieu of increasing opportunities for small 
businesses. The current environment has provided the opportunity for Foreign Military 
Sales, and the Javelin’s exportability has been able to take great advantage of these sales. 
The current outside environment, however, threatens the program; the marketplace lacks 
competitive small businesses, which hampers effective competition. The current 
environment has seen increasingly effective countermeasures on competitor nations’ 
armored vehicles. This threatens the Javelin’s overmatch capabilities. 
Past programs can provide today’s acquisition workforce with applicable lessons 
learned. Our current BBP initiatives do provide real-world benefits. 
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This joint applied project (JAP) analyzes the Javelin anti-tank weapon system 
program and that program’s adherence to our current Better Buying Power (BBP) best 
practices. 
The BBP plan was introduced in 2010 by Under Secretary of Defense for 
Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (USD[AT&L]) Ashton Carter (Carter, 2010a) and 
Principal Deputy Under Secretary Frank Kendall to improve the Department of Defense’s 
(DoD’s) acquisition processes (Serbu, 2017). There had been a decline in the DoD’s yearly 
budget growth rate around this time and defense acquisition leaders were seeking ways to 
do more with less; BBP laid out a number of initiatives to improve defense procurement 
productivity (Serbu, 2017). Initiatives included should-cost management, methods to 
improve competition, affordability mandates, and other strategies to increase defense 
buying power (Serbu, 2017). Over the following years, BBP was updated with newer 
iterations of mandates, BBP 2.0 in 2012, and BBP 3.0 in 2014 (Serbu, 2017). 
The Javelin, shown in Figure 1, is a man-portable, shoulder-fired anti-tank missile 
system (Whitmore, 2009). The system has two main components, the Command Launch 
Unit (CLU) and the Launch Tube Assembly (LTA). The CLU is reusable and the LTA, 
which contains the fire-and-forget guided missile, is for one-time use (Whitmore, 2009). 
The Javelin missile employs an infrared seeker that guides the missile to destroy vehicles, 
tanks, helicopters, or buildings (Duddu, 2014). With a maximum range of 2,500 meters, 
the Javelin is considered to be one of the world’s best man-portable anti-tank weapon 
systems (Duddu, 2014). 
The Javelin system went through its acquisition process before any implementation 
of the BBP initiatives. The first development contract was awarded in 1989 to the Javelin 
Joint Venture (JJV) by the U.S. Army Aviation and Missile Command (AMCOM); it was 
to be the replacement for the older M47 Dragon anti-tank missile system (Whitmore, 2009). 
The Javelin’s development was managed by the Close Combat Weapons System (CCWS) 
Project Office under Program Executive Office (PEO) Missiles and Space (Whitmore, 
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2009). Low Rate Initial Production (LRIP) began in 1994; the Javelin was fielded to some 
select U.S. Army units in 1996, and Full Rate Production (FRP) started in May of 1997 
(Whitmore, 2009). Today the Javelin is managed by the CCWS Project Office and the two 
main contractors of the JJV are Lockheed Martin and Raytheon (Whitmore, 2009). 
 
Figure 1. Soldier readies the Javelin system. Source: Hawkins (2016).  
Past programs can provide today’s acquisition workforce with applicable “lessons 
learned”. This JAP uses the BBP mandates as a standard to judge and analyze the Javelin 
program. The history and development of the Javelin along with the BBP were thoroughly 
researched for this report. The efficacy of the BBP mandates are explored by comparison 
to real-world defense acquisition. 
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II. BACKGROUND 
A. BETTER BUYING POWER 
The BBP initiative was introduced by USD(AT&L) Ashton B. Carter on 28 June 
2010. His BBP memo was a proclamation to the acquisition workforce on ways to increase 
efficiency and affordability in the acquisition process at a time when the defense budget 
was tightening. At the time, $400 billion of the DoD’s $700 billion yearly budget was spent 
on contracts to outside entities for the acquisition of services and materiel, an efficient DoD 
ought to focus on the affordability of these buys (Carter, 2010a). 
1. BBP 1.0 
The original BBP core objectives at introduction were: 
• Deliver the warfighting capability we need for the dollars we have 
• Get better buying power for warfighter and taxpayer 
• Restore affordability to defense goods and services 
• Improve defense industry productivity  
• Remove government impediments to leanness 
• Avoid program turbulence 
• Maintain a vibrant and financially healthy defense industry. (Carter, 
2010a) 
A point continually stressed by the early BBP initiatives is that more than half of 
the DoD’s annual budget is spent on contracts for services and goods (Carter, 2010b). In 
Carter’s memo to the acquisition workforce he called upon them to “DO MORE 
WITHOUT MORE” (2010b). Internally improving the procurement practices could have 
the potential for great cost savings while still delivering needed capabilities to the 
4 
warfighter. The early BBP memos were not to be viewed as set in stone mandates, but as 
the beginning of an implementation and refinement process (Carter, 2010b). 
The last 2010 Ashton Carter BBP memo emphasized controlling cost growth, 
mandating affordability, and it became required that all Acquisition Category (ACAT) I 
programs will have their affordability reviewed at every milestone decision review (Carter, 
2010c). It was expected that acquisition professionals shall start implementation of the 
initiatives. At this time ACAT I programs were also mandated to establish Should-Cost 
management tools, set up affordability targets for milestones, increase use of Fixed Price 
Incentive Firm Target (FPIFT) contracts, strategize to improve real competition 
opportunities, and improve the acquisition workforce’s tradecraft abilities (Carter, 2010c). 
2. BBP 2.0 
Two years later, in 2012, the new USD(AT&L) Frank Kendall introduced the next 
iteration with Better Buying Power 2.0: Continuing the pursuit for greater efficiency and 
productivity in defense spending. Kendall’s 2012 BBP 2.0 memo to the acquisition 
workforce introduced 36 initiatives and organized them into seven focus areas, it was 
emphasized again that BBP will continue to be a process of continuous improvement and 
never a permanent policy set. There was evidence that the original BBP implementation 
has already started to show improvement in the acquisition process and this newest iteration 
would address potential gaps (Kendall, 2012). This JAP report explores a number of the 
focus areas and their mandates. 
One focus area of BBP 2.0, “Eliminate Unproductive Processes and Bureaucracy,” 
is streamlining the bureaucracy (Kendall, 2013). The initiatives under this focus area want 
to reduce the frequency of Office of Secretary of Defense (OSD)-level reviews and to re-
emphasize program manager responsibility (Kendall, 2012). Clean and clear lines of 
responsibility can entropy over time so program manager accountability always has to be 
emphasized (Kendall, 2013). Requirements where the costs outweigh the benefits should 
be eliminated and cycle times should be reduced (Kendall, 2012). DoD bureaucracies can 
suffer from creep, both in requirements on industry, and in the size of its organizations. To 
increase buying power superfluous industry requirements, the kind that do not add value 
5 
or performance, have to be identified and eliminated. The root causes for delays in the life 
cycle process also have to be identified and fixed (Kendall, 2012).  
The “Improve Tradecraft in Acquisition of Services” focus area has initiatives 
aimed at improving the acquisition of services because this is an area that has a great 
potential for improved efficiencies and opportunities for cost savings (Kendall, 2012). 
Kendall’s (2012) memo mandated that senior managers shall be assigned to contracts that 
manage the acquisition of services. Next, these services should be segmented into six 
categories and these segments have to be uniform across the DoD. He advised that 
requirement definitions should be improved and their creep prevented. Also, acquisition 
tradecraft is strengthened by market research and its increased use by the workforce 
(Kendall, 2012). Program managers are mandated to take steps to increase the participation 
of small businesses in service contracts (Kendall, 2012). Small businesses that provide 
services are an area where the DoD could find cost reductions. His memo further noted that 
contract management should be strengthened outside the standard acquisition chain 
because a large number of service contracts happen outside of this area and occur all over 
the DoD, such as in small installations. This focus area also calls for the expanded use of 
requirements review boards along with tripwires to better manage service contacts 
(Kendall, 2012). 
The “Improve the Professionalism of the Total Acquisition Workforce” focus area 
seeks to improve the overall capabilities of the workforce; their professionalism is arguably 
the most important area of the BBP (Kendall, 2012). The defense acquisition system should 
establish high standards for its leadership positions. In the past leaders were not held to 
sufficiently high standards; it should now be required that potential acquisition leaders have 
stronger professional qualifications and real-world experience before being promoted into 
key positions (Kendall, 2012). DoD does but can do more to increase the recognition of 
acquisition managers, as the requirement to manage large programs and service contracts 
takes significant skill (Kendall, 2012). Anything the DoD can do to raise the prestige of 
this workforce will improve morale and defense buying power. The workforce must also 
be more cost conscious; costs matter and a workforce with increased cost consciousness 
has the ability to stop needless budget growth (Kendall, 2012). 
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3. BBP 3.0 
The Office of the USD(AT&L) collected data from the beginning with 
implementation of BBP, through BBP 2.0, and in September of 2014 released the BBP 3.0 
White Paper that reviewed the progress of the last several years and laid out plans for the 
future (Kendall, 2014). Kendall’s white paper (2014) explained that there had been 
sufficient time since the first BBP mandates had been put into place that it was now possible 
to review the workforce’s experiences and analyze how procurement conditions have 
changed. According to Kendall, many of the initiatives such as improving the 
professionalism of the workforce, mandating affordability, and increasing competition 
opportunity were highly successful and would continue to be emphasized. The new area 
that drew the most concern was the increase in competitor nation capabilities, the United 
States was losing its overmatch dominance and BBP 3.0 was formed with this in mind 
(Kendall, 2014). 
The BBP 3.0 implementation memo was released in April of the following year, 
2015, there were seven focus areas as in BBP 2.0 but the emphasis had been shifted towards 
technical innovation and excellence (Kendall, 2015a). Most of the original core initiatives, 
affordability caps, effective incentives, should-cost management, and workforce 
professionalism were still a part of the BBP 3.0 implementation memo (Kendall, 2015a). 
The initiative “Anticipate and plan for responsive and emerging threats by building 
stronger partnerships of acquisition, intelligence and requirements communities” (Kendall, 
2015a, p. 3) called for better working relationships with the intelligence community. The 
initiative, acknowledged that building cooperation between the acquisition workforce and 
the requirement writers has always been an area that needed work. The BBP 3.0 
implementation memo wants to expand this and include the intelligence community to 
better plan for future acquisitions (Kendall, 2015a). 
B. THE JAVELIN WEAPON SYSTEM 
The Javelin, shown in Figure 2, is a man-portable anti-tank weapon system, used 
by warfighters in the U.S. Army, U.S. Marine Corps, and 15 foreign nations (Close Combat 
Weapon Systems [CCWS] Project Office, n.d.). The Javelin anti-armor missile system is 
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currently supplied by Raytheon and Lockheed Martin’s JJV Team (Raytheon, 2016). It is 
composed of two sub-systems: the standalone CLU and the expendable Javelin LTA, which 
contains the Javelin missile (Northrop Grumman, 2018). The reusable CLU is used for day 
and night target acquisition and can also be used for surveillance (CCWS Project Office, 
n.d.). The Javelin missile is a fire-and-forget projectile that soft launches from its 
expendable LTA and flies to the CLU designated target directly or by top attack; the missile 
has a qualified range of 2500 meters (CCWS Project Office, n.d.). The Javelin Weapon 
System is managed by the U.S. Army’s CCWS Project Office under the Program Executive 
Office (PEO) Missiles and Space (Program Executive Office [PEO] Missiles and 
Space, n.d.). 
 
Figure 2. Javelin Block 0. Source: CCWS Project Office (n.d.).  
1. Operating the Javelin 
The Javelin system is capable of being fired by only one soldier and is designed to 
operate in most environments (Raytheon, 2016). The Javelin missile projectile is guided 
by infrared (Roblin, 2016). The Javelin’s CLU is the reusable part of the system; the CLU 
8 
has optical zoom and thermal view targeting capabilities (Roblin, 2016). The CLU and 
loaded LTA weigh in at a combined 50 pounds, making the Javelin man-portable (Roblin, 
2016). Operators will usually fire the weapon while seated or crouched; the operator will 
sight through the CLU, shown in Figure 3, to identify a target and lock on the infrared 
seeker (Roblin, 2016). 
 
Figure 3. Marine holding a Javelin CLU. Source: Whitmore (2009).  
When fired, the Javelin missiles will soft launch out of the LTA to a safe distance 
away from the operator and then the main missile engine will function, taking the missile 
to the target (Roblin, 2016). This soft launch function was designed into the system to 
protect the operator by minimizing back blast. In Roblin’s 2016 article he describes another 
key feature of the Javelin system is its fire-and-forget capability. Once the missile is fired, 
the operator does not have to direct it as the Javelin missile guides itself to the target 
(Roblin, 2016). 
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2. Javelin Development History 
Anti-tank and anti-armor systems have been an important part of the U.S. military’s 
materiel acquisition ever since armored vehicles started to appear on the battlefield 
(Angelis, Dillard, & Ford, 2013). The Javelin was the replacement for the M47 Dragon 
anti-tank weapon system; the Dragon was first introduced in the 1970s (Angelis et al., 
2013). It was optically navigated by a command wire connecting the missile to the 
operator’s control unit (Angelis et al., 2013). Military users at the time considered the 
Dragon lacking in range, usability, lethality, and reliability (Angelis et al., 2013). The effort 
to replace the Dragon was called the Advanced Anti-armor Weapon System–Medium 
(AAWS–M) project which eventually led to the current Javelin program (Angelis et al., 
2013). 
The AAWS-M program started with the intent to bring a man-portable anti-tank 
weapon that would improve and replace the existing Dragon (Jane’s by IHS Markit, 2018). 
The Anti-armor Mission Need statement was issued in January 1978 and articulated the 
underperformance issues the Army was having with its Dragon system (Pike & Sherman, 
1999). The AAWS-M was going to be able to defeat enemy tanks at any time of day and 
also in degraded visual situations due to smoke or dust (Jane’s by IHS Markit, 2018). By 
1986, U.S. Army Missile Command awarded three technical demonstration contracts to 
the three most promising technology offerors: Ford Aerospace, Hughes Aircraft Missile 
Systems Group, and Texas Instruments Defense Systems & Electronics Group (Jane’s by 
IHS Markit, 2018). The Army wanted these contractors to deliver an operational system 
for a comparison shoot-off (Jane’s by IHS Markit, 2018). 
Defense Advanced Research Project Agency (DARPA) also assisted anti-tank 
weapon development starting in the 1970s with their Tank Breaker program (Defense 
Advanced Research Projects Agency [DARPA], n.d.). The U.S. Army conducted its 
AAWS-M comparison shoot-off testing in 1987 to 1988, between the industry options that 
were developed in the DARPA Tank Breaker Program (DARPA, n.d.). The Texas 
Instruments solution won and would go on to full scale development with the AAWS-M 
program. The Army eventually renamed the AAWS-M to the Javelin (DARPA, n.d.). 
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The Engineering and Manufacturing Development (EMD) phase contract for the 
Javelin was awarded in 1989 (Pike & Sherman, 1999). The Army completed the Javelin’s 
Initial Operational Test and Evaluation (IOT&E) by the end of 1993 and milestone III was 
passed in 1997 along with the FRP decision (Pike & Sherman, 1999). 
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III. RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND METHODOLOGY 
The objective of this research project is to do a qualitative analysis of an acquisition 
program’s adherence to our current BBP best practices. The Javelin development program 
was chosen for analysis because all phases of the development took place before the first 
release of BBP. 
A. PRIMARY RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The research questions of this project compare our current BBP best practices to 
the Javelin anti-tank weapon program’s development and fielding. 
Primary Research Question 1: What were the internal strengths and weaknesses of 
the Javelin program according to the BBP standard?  
Primary Research Question 2: What were the external opportunities and threats to 
the Javelin program according to the BBP standard? How has the Javelin program 
responded? 
B. SECONDARY RESEARCH QUESTION 
Using the BBP standard to analyze a legacy development program and currently 
fielded item provides insights into the defense acquisition process. While past performance 
is not a guarantee of future performance, past events can increase the knowledge base that 
personnel currently have. 
Secondary Research Question: What are the most relevant and useful “lessons 
learned” from this BBP analysis to the current acquisition workforce? 
C. PURPOSE AND BENEFIT 
The BBP initiative has been the one of the largest defense acquisition strategy 
updates in recent history. “Testing” the applicability of the BBP on past completed 
programs may reveal the current relevance of today’s initiatives.  
12 
The Javelin program was, and still is a large Army acquisition effort. Research on 
past programs is always important because the acquisition workforce can learn much from 
real life examples. 
The benefits of this JAP research expand and improve the understanding of the 
BBP. This JAP is a low cost simulator where the author compared our abstract acquisition 
ideals of the BBP with past real-world acquisition programs. Applying the BBP to a past 
program improve the author and reader’s understanding of the BBP and glean “lessons 
learned” from past programs.  
D. METHODOLOGY 
The author of this JAP conducted the research in two parts. The first part of the 
research collected information on the formation, history, and current usage of the BBP 
initiative. The second part was a historical research of the Javelin program. This JAP drew 
heavily from the U.S. government, U.S. Army program information, Naval Postgraduate 
School (NPS) theses and projects, the BBP initiative, Defense Acquisition University, and 
many online sources. No data were collected from interviews. 
The primary analysis method used was a strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and 
threats (SWOT) analysis. SWOT analysis is commonly applied in business and program 
management. This JAP analyzed the internal strengths and internal weaknesses of the 
Javelin program. Also analyzed were the external opportunities and threats to the Javelin 
program from the wider world and how the Javelin program has responded. These 
strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats are all viewed from a BBP standard. 
The author of this JAP used programmatic management skills as taught by the NPS 
to address the research questions. 
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IV. DATA AND ANALYSIS 
The primary analysis method used for this project is a SWOT analysis. The first 
primary research question being answered is: What were the internal strengths and 
weaknesses of the Javelin program according to the BBP standard? The second primary 
research question is: What were the external opportunities and threats to the Javelin 
program according to the BBP standard and how has the Javelin program responded? After 
these questions are answered, this project answers the secondary research question: What 
are the most relevant and useful “lessons learned” from this BBP analysis to the current 
acquisition workforce? 
This report used the initiatives from BBP 2.0 and BBP 3.0 for analysis. BBP 2.0 
was released on 13 November 2012 by USD(AT&L) Frank Kendall. The memo, Better 
Buying Power 2.0: Continuing the Pursuit for Greater Efficiency and Productivity in 
Defense Spending, revised the original core objectives into seven focus areas covering 36 
specific initiatives. For the reader’s convenience those seven BBP 2.0 focus areas along 
with their specific initiatives are shown in Table 1. 
Table 1. Better Buying Power 2.0 focus areas. Adapted from Kendall (2012). 




• Mandate affordability as a requirement. 
• Institute a system of investment planning to derive 
affordability caps. 
• Enforce affordability caps. 
2 Control Costs 
Throughout the 
Product Lifestyle 
• Implement “should cost based management. 
• Eliminate redundancy within Warfighter portfolios. 
• Institute a system to measure the cost performance of 
programs and institutions and to assess the effectiveness of 
acquisition policies. 
• Build stronger partnerships with the requirements 
community to control costs. 
• Increase the incorporation of defense exportability features 




• Align profitability more tightly with Department goals. 
• Employ appropriate contract types. 
• Increase use of Fixed Price Incentive contracts in Low Rate 
Initial Production. 
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Number BBP Focus Area Specific Initiatives 
Industry and 
Government 
• Better define value in “best value” competitions. 
• When LPTA is used, define Technically Acceptable to 
ensure needed quality. 
• Institute a superior supplier incentive program. 
• Increase effective use of Performance-Based Logistics. 
• Reduce backlog of DCAA Audits without compromising 
effectiveness. 





• Reduce frequency of OSD-level reviews. 
• Re-emphasize AE, PEO, and PM responsibility and 
accountability. 
• Eliminate requirements imposed on industry where costs 
outweigh benefits. 





• Emphasizing competition strategies and creating and 
maintaining competitive environments. 
• Enforce open system architectures and effectively manage 
technical data rights. 
• Increase small business roles and opportunities. 






• Assign senior managers for acquisition of services. 
• Adopt uniform services market segmentation. 
• Improve requirements definition; prevent requirements 
creep. 
• Increase use of market research. 
• Increase small business participation. 
• Strengthen contract management outside the normal 
acquisition chain. 
• Expand use of requirements review boards and tripwires. 
7 Improve the 
Professionalism 
of the Total 
Acquisition 
Workforce 
• Establish higher standards for key leadership positions; 
establish stronger professional qualification requirements 
for all acquisition specialties. 
• Increase the recognition of excellence in acquisition 
management. 
• Continue to increase the cost consciousness of the 
acquisition workforce. 




1. Incentivize Productivity and Innovation in Industry and Government 
The BBP 2.0 initiatives in focus area three, “Incentivize Productivity and 
Innovation in Industry and Government” (Kendall, 2012) increase government buying 
power by working smarter with industry. The first way to do this, according to Kendall, is 
to align industry profitability with DoD goals, competent program managers should be able 
to cost effectively motivate industry with the right contract types and incentives. 
Employing the appropriate contract type is necessary because defense acquisition is never 
a one size fits all environment, management must learn to take advantage of the many 
contract types available in federal regulations (Kendall, 2012). 
According to Kendall (2012), the LRIP phase should increase the use of Fixed Price 
Incentive (FPI) contracts. A FPI contract, sometimes called a firm target contract, is when 
specific targets are negotiated at the outset and then awarded with an incentive when the 
contractor performance meets them (Fixed price incentive firm target contracts, 1994). 
Frank Kendall wrote in 2012 that FPI contracts are most applicable for the LRIP acquisition 
phase. 
The government, Kendall (2012) says, should better define value when using a best 
value competition contract. He explains that different contractors will submit products with 
varying levels of performance to a competitive bid, when the government is confronted 
with these different choices of performance, someone has to better define the performance-
to-cost tradeoffs to make a best value acquisition decision. Lowest Price Technically 
Acceptable (LPTA) contracts have a similar problem with too much subjectivity and not 
enough specificity, this focus area mandates that when LPTA is used, what is technically 
acceptable has to be very well defined (Kendall, 2012). 
This focus area has several logistics related initiatives. A supplier incentive 
program should be instituted and programs should increase their use of Performance Based 
Logistics (PBL) (Kendall, 2012). Traditional logistics would measure outcomes by raw 
product outputs such as number of items produced or total work hours provided by the 
contractor (Spring, 2010). Spring explains that PBL measures logistics by a performance 
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outcome; industry is compensated not for producing repair items or billing support hours, 
but by keeping a system performing at a required level. There is a preponderance of 
evidence that effectively implemented PBL will improve support performance while 
reducing costs (Kendall, 2012). 
The Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA) is responsible for providing DoD 
with financial advisory and auditing services (Defense Contract Audit Agency [DCAA], 
2018). BBP mandates that DCAA reduce its backlog of audits without compromising the 
agency’s effectiveness (Kendall, 2012). 
Focus area three from BBP 2.0 also mandates that programs be initiated and 
expanded to leverage private industry’s research and development efforts (Kendall, 2012). 
2. Javelin Performance-Based Logistics 
U.S. Army AMCOM reported in a 2016 article that the Javelin had one of the 
highest tactical operational readiness levels in the DoD (Hawkins, 2016). According to 
Hawkins, from 2008 through 2015, the Javelin’s tactical operational readiness rate was 
greater than 99 percent. She further noted that a 99 percent readiness rate surpasses the 
contract requirements and exceeded the Army’s expectations. The contract only required a 
readiness of 90 percent (Kendall, 2015b). Well executed PBL were credited with this level 
of readiness success (Hawkins, 2016). 
Life cycle support is performed by the Javelin Lifecycle Contractor Support 
(LCCS) PBL team (Kendall, 2015b). The LCCS PBL team is made up of the U.S. Army 
CCWS Project Office and the JJV; a contractor partnership between Lockheed Martin and 
Raytheon (Kendall, 2015b). This team works with Fort Benning Training Support Center, 
Letterkenny Army Depot, and DHL Global Forwarding to support the Javelin LCCS PBL 
goal of providing Javelin material reliability and availability to the Warfighter (Kendall, 
2015b). 
The Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Logistics & Readiness 
administers the multiple yearly awards for outstanding PBL performance (Office of the 
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Logistics & Materiel Readiness, n.d.). There are three 
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award categories in the Secretary of Defense PBL Awards Program. One for the 
Component Level, the Sub-system Level, and System Level; the System Level award is 
named the Gerald R. “Jerry” Beck after the man that initiated the award program (Office 
of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Logistics & Materiel Readiness, n.d.). Gerald 
Beck is honored due to his long and distinguished government career in defense logistics 
and he had a significant role in the early implementation of PBL (Office of the Assistant 
Secretary of Defense for Logistics & Materiel Readiness, n.d.). 
The U.S. Army JJV PBL Team won the System Level Gerald R. “Jerry” Beck 
Award for the 2015 cycle (Kendall, 2015b). The JJV PBL Team was recognized for setting 
up a successful solution for the Government customer, Army CCWS Project Office 
(Kendall, 2015b). Kendell’s PBL Award memo (2015b) noted that this PBL team was able 
to reduce the per-year contractor support cost by 48 percent, from $62 million to $32 
million. Even with this reduction in costs, the Javelin LCCS PBL team was still able to 
maintain tactical operation readiness levels of greater than 99 percent for eight years 
straight from 2008 to 2015 (Kendall, 2015b). 
The Office of Secretary of Defense collects the explanation of accomplishments 
information for each PBL annual award winner, this nomination paper goes into more 
details (Office of the Secretary of Defense [OSD], 2015). The 2015 cycle system level 
accomplishments paper reported that logistics support for the CLU was able to maintain an 
operation readiness level of greater than 99%, higher than the 90% contract requirement. 
It was further reported that the one- to two-day replenishment fill rate was greater than 
99% for support of depot repairs and Army Brigade Level Authorized Stockage Levels. 
The Javelin’s Field Tactical Trainer (FTT) had a repair induction increase to 56 per month 
from 15 per month, which is a 3.73 times increase (OSD, 2015). 
3. Organizational Strengths Analysis 
This project found that an internal strength of the Javelin program was its successful 
implementation of effective PBL. Effective use of PBL is an initiative mandated in both 
BBP 2.0 (Kendall, 2012) and BBP 3.0 (Kendall, 2015a). BBP recognizes that effective 
PBL can incentivize productivity in industry and Government (Kendall, 2015a). The 
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Javelin PBL team was so successful that it was recognized by the Office of Secretary of 
Defense with the Beck System Level award for outstanding PBL performance. The 
government-industry partnership between the CCWS Project Office and the JJV, Lockheed 
Martin and Raytheon, were able to maintain several consecutive years of high operational 
readiness levels while at the same time reducing costs. 
B. WEAKNESSES 
1. Promote Effective Competition 
The BBP mandates that program managers seek ways promote effective 
competition, this focus area suggests that program managers take advantage of acquisition 
strategies that emphasize competition and create a competitive environment (Kendall, 
2012). When developing systems, program managers should be effective at managing 
technical data rights and enforce on systems an open architecture design (Kendall, 2012). 
The Technology Development (TD) phase must be used to reduce risk for the program; 
competitive designs can be thoroughly tested against each other in the TD at less cost to 
the government instead of making changes in later more expensive phases (Kendall, 2012). 
Opportunities and roles for small businesses should also be increased because these smaller 
contractors are often an inexpensive source of innovation (Kendall, 2012). 
2. Achieve Affordable Programs 
Achieving affordable programs is accomplished by setting up affordability caps 
before the program is even initiated (Kendall, 2015a). This BBP focus area calls on the 
OSD and the Service leadership to determine if future budgets can afford a proposed 
program. Kendall (2015a) observed that in the past new programs were proposed and 
implemented without proper analysis of their affordability on future defense budgets. Also 
mandated is an affordability analysis on each proposed program and then the establishment 
of an affordability cap to keep costs in line. These affordability caps are now reviewed at 
milestone decisions (Kendall, 2015a). 
The affordability caps will be derived from a system of investment planning; BBP 
asserts that service and component leadership view their capabilities as a capital investment 
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(Kendall, 2012). Kendall (2012) holds that when leadership makes future acquisition 
decisions, it will have to be done within a capital investment portfolio framework that plans 
out system life cycles up to four decades. This will limit the unnecessary expenditure on 
programs that are already covered in the existing portfolio (Kendall, 2012). 
3. Javelin and Industry 
The Javelin anti-tank weapon system is supplied by the JJV which is a contractor 
partnership between Lockheed Martin and Raytheon (Crews, 2018). Some parts of the 
Javelin are subcontracted by the JJV out to other companies. Northrop Grumman is the 
latest producer of the Javelin LTA (Northrop Grumman, 2018). The U.S. government 
considers the two major contractors of the JJV to be Raytheon and Lockheed Martin 
(Director, Operational Test and Evaluation [DOT&E], 2018). 
Raytheon is based in Waltham Massachusetts and employs around 64,000 workers 
(Raytheon, 2018). This large defense contractor has been in business since 1922, supports 
customers in at least 80 countries, and made $25 billion in sales in 2017, their headquarters 
for the missile systems branch is in Tucson Arizona (Raytheon, 2018). The Tucson Arizona 
location is the point of contact for the government (DOT&E, 2018). Raytheon is a 
publically traded company on the New York Stock Exchange (Wichner, 2018). 
Lockheed Martin has its headquarters in Bethesda Maryland and employs around 
100,000 workers (Lockheed Martin, 2018). Lockheed Martin, same as Raytheon, is a 
publicly traded company on the New York Stock Exchange, they support customers in at 
least 70 nations and made $51 billion in sales in 2017 (Lockheed Martin, 2018). Of their 
100,000 employees Lockheed Martin claims around 49,000 of them are information 
technology professionals, engineers, or scientists. Lockheed Martin also claims that in 
2017 it committed $4.4 billion in contract money to around 9,000 small businesses 
(Lockheed Martin, 2018). 
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4. Javelin Affordability 
In December 2017, a Javelin Foreign Military Sales (FMS) to Ukraine was 
approved for $47 million of materiel (Brown, 2018). This $47 million deal would provide 
Ukraine with 37 CLUs and 210 Javelin anti-tank missiles (Brown, 2018). 
The Javelin is considered one of the most effective man-portable anti-tank missile 
systems in the world, but also considered “an expensive piece of kit, with each missile 
typically costing more than the targets it eliminates” (Roblin, 2016, p. 1). It has been 
reported that Javelin missile assemblies each cost around $80,000 (Roblin, 2016). Each 
CLU costs around $126,000 (Matishak, 2016). 
5. Organizational Weakness Analysis 
An internal organizational weakness of the Javelin program is its overdependence 
on large contractors instead of increasing opportunities for small businesses. BBP 
mandates that managers make an effort to increase small business participation when 
possible. Increasing small business participation is vital for promoting effective 
competition and reducing costs. Raytheon and Lockheed Martin are both companies with 
multi-billion-dollar-a-year sales and that employ tens of thousands of employees. The 
Javelin system is viewed as effective but also expensive. Each missile can cost around 
$80,000 each, sometimes costing more than the vehicle targets it destroys (Roblin, 2016). 
This research project could not find evidence that the CCWS Project Office made an effort 
to increase small business opportunities. By the BBP initiatives this is an area that needs 
improvement. 
C. OPPORTUNITIES 
1. Control Costs throughout the Product Life Cycle 
To control costs throughout the product life cycle, focus area two of BBP 2.0 
mandates that management will have a “should cost” strategy (Kendall, 2012). Should cost 
implementation means that managers will target their costs below existing independent 
estimates and strive to achieve these lower target costs (Kendall, 2012). The chain of 
command should prioritize proactive cost control and reward subordinates that implement 
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it (Kendall, 2012). Eliminating warfighter portfolio redundancy controls costs throughout 
the life cycle, separate acquisition efforts can sometimes duplicate or overlap each other so 
the constant review of the warfighter portfolio is necessary to prevent redundant efforts 
(Kendall, 2012). 
Acquisition professionals and leadership should also “Institute a system to measure 
the cost performance of programs and institutions and to assess the effectiveness of 
acquisition policies” (Kendall, 2012). The DoD requires real data metrics to assess 
productivity, institutions that are part of the acquisition process have to be judged 
objectively and to do that metrics first have to be developed (Kendall, 2012). After metrics 
are developed they will need to be collected and then the acquisition process will be able 
to make assessments that are objective and data driven (Kendall, 2012). 
Controlling costs will need stronger partnerships between the requirements 
community and the acquisition community (Kendall, 2012). Too often the people writing 
requirements are not sufficiently communicating with people in acquisition that will 
ultimately try to fulfill the requirements (Kendall, 2012). Stronger partnerships put all the 
stakeholders on the same page at the beginning; building and maintaining a strong network 
provides a feedback loop where both sides can propose and adjust to the current reality 
(Kendall, 2012). 
System designs should incorporate defense exportability when possible (Kendall, 
2012). FMS are government to government agreements between the United States and 
foreign customers for the sale of U.S. defense articles (Defense Security Cooperation 
Agency [DSCA], n.d.). These FMS bring in funding to our nation’s military industrial base 
and strengthen our overseas partnerships. BBP views international cooperation as a win-
win for both partners and mandated system design exportability in the initiatives (Kendall, 
2012). 
2. Javelin Foreign Military Sales 
The Javelin is often exported to foreign militaries, according to the U.S. Army the 
Javelin is used by 15 foreign allies (CCWS Project Office, n.d.). The Defense Security 
Cooperation Agency (DSCA) administers security agreements between the U.S. and 
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foreign allied nations (DSCA, 2017b). DSCA focuses on developing allied nation’s 
military capabilities that advance U.S. interests (DSCA, 2017b). The U.S. State 
Department will make the determination on FMS and then DSCA handles the 
administration of the exchange; DSCA oversees the FMS of U.S. materiel such as the 
Javelin system (DSCA, 2018). 
In the past years, DSCA has administered many Javelin FMS. When a possible 
Javelin FMS is approved by the State Department, the DSCA is required by law to publish 
a notice for each upcoming sale (DSCA, 2018). Ukraine was approved for an FMS of 
Javelin missiles and Javelin CLUs worth $47 million in March 2018 (DSCA, 2018). In 
2017, Georgia asked for and was approved for $75 million worth of Javelin system 
material: 72 CLUs, 10 Basic Skills Trainers (BSTs), and up to 70 simulation rounds 
(DSCA, 2017a). In 2015, a $57 million Javelin FMS was approved to the Taipei Economic 
and Cultural Representative Office (DSCA, 2015a). Qatar was approved for $122 million 
Javelin FMS in 2013 (DSCA, 2013). The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia was approved for a 
$71 million Javelin FMS in 2010 (DSCA, 2010). Jordan was approved for a $388 million 
FMS of Javelin system materiel and support in 2009 (DSCA, 2009). 
In regards to the large 2009 FMS proposal to The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, 
the DSCA said the “proposed sale would contribute to the foreign policy and national 
security of the United States by helping to improve the security of a major non-NATO ally 
that has been, and continues to be an important force for political stability and economic 
progress in the Middle East.” (“Jordan requests,” 2009). This FMS $388 million proposal 
to Jordan was for 162 Javelin CLUs with all necessary accessories and logistic support 
(“Jordan requests,” 2009).  
Javelin FMS are often full support packages. For example, in 2015, the State 
Department approved a possible Javelin FMS to Lithuania for an estimated value of $55 
million, the government of Lithuania was interested in purchasing 74 CLUs, 220 Javelin 
missiles, and 10 Javelin fly-to-buy missiles (DSCA, 2015b). Also included were technical 
support, logistics support and the transportation of the Major Defense Equipment (MDE) 
from the United States to Lithuania (DSCA, 2015b). The approved FMS to Qatar in 2013 
included training equipment such as the Enhanced Performance Basic Skills Trainer 
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(EPBST), Missile Simulation Rounds (MSRs), and Javelin weapon effects simulators; with 
a possible sale of 500 Javelin missiles (DSCA, 2013). This possible FMS to Qatar was 
estimated to cost up to $122 million, it included logistics support, 50 CLUs, spare parts, 
and support items (DSCA, 2013). 
3. External Opportunities Analysis 
The external environment has provided opportunities for the Javelin program to 
satisfy initiatives of the BBP. BBP 2.0 mandated that programs “Increase the incorporation 
of defense exportability features in initial design” (Kendall, 2012). BBP 3.0 further 
encouraged activities that strengthen international cooperation (Kendall, 2015a). The 
international defense marketplace has provided an opportunity for the Javelin system to be 
exported to foreign allies and partnered nations. The relatively light weight design of the 
Javelin lends itself to exportability. The Javelin does not have a heavy logistics tail as in 
other systems. The missiles, one-time use, are self-contained in the LTA and easily attach 
to the CLU unit. Many partnered nations do not have the logistics capabilities of the United 
States and benefit from simple self-contained weapon systems. Effective anti-tank missile 
systems can also be a cost effective alternative for partnered nations that cannot field 
sufficient numbers of tanks on their own but still need to oppose enemy armor. 
D. THREATS 
1. Achieve Dominant Capabilities 
BBP 3.0 acknowledged that U.S. technology superiority is being challenged by the 
increasing capabilities of near-pear competitor nations (Kendall, 2015a). Since the end of 
the Cold War the United States has enjoyed global overmatch in combat capability but this 
difference in power is quickly shrinking (Kendall, 2015a). A focus area of BBP 3.0 is titled 
“Achieve Dominant Capabilities While Controlling Life cycle Costs” (Kendall, 2015a, 
p. 2). The initiatives in this focus area encourage the acquisition workforce to improve its 
long term research and development planning; overmatch capability is highly dependent 
on an acquisition community that can effectively identify existing and potential 
technologies (Kendall, 2015a). BBP 3.0 mandates that the U.S. government partners with 
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domestic industry and foreign allies in the upcoming decades; warfighter capability 
development has to be a long range planning activity not a short term one (Kendall, 2015a). 
2. Javelin and Foreign Armor 
The Javelin anti-tank missile system has two different attacks modes (Brown, 
2018). First is the direct attack mode. The missile will fly straight from the operator to the 
target. This mode is typically used for fixed building locations or helicopters. The other 
mode is the top attack which is used for tanks and armored vehicles. In top attack mode the 
missile will fly high above the target tank and then come straight down onto the tank where 
the armor is typically the weakest (Brown, 2018). 
The Javelin missile’s shaped charged warhead has the ability to defeat 600 to 800 
millimeters of steel armor which would not be effective hitting the side of a modern tank 
but is very effective in top attack mode (Roblin, 2016). There are Explosive Reactive 
Armor (ERA) systems that do protect the tops of modern tanks; some newer Javelin missile 
warheads have a tandem charge design that may defeat some ERA systems (Roblin, 2016). 
There is sufficient evidence that the Javelin can destroy Russian built T-34 and T-
62 tanks (Brown, 2018). Brown acknowledges that it is unconfirmed if the Javelin can 
destroy newer Russian T-72B3M and T-90 tanks equipped with the Relikt ERA system. It 
is not known to the public if the Javelin has been tested against Relikt ERA systems 
(Brown, 2018). 
The Javelin system was used in combat against enemy armor during the U.S. 
invasion of Iraq in 2003 in the Battle of Debecka Pass (Roblin, 2016). U.S. Special Forces 
armed with the Javelin system were able to destroy enemy MT-LB armored personnel 
carriers, T-55 tanks, and troop trucks (Gresham, 2015). According to John D. Gresham’s 
2015 article about the battle, 19 Javelin missiles were fired and 17 scored hits. All 19 
missiles were fired at targets greater than 2,200 meters away, which is greater than the 
Javelin’s recommended combat range of 2,000 meters (Gresham, 2015). 
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3. External Threats Analysis 
This research project views two threats from the external environment. One is a 
marketplace that is dominated by large contractors: Raytheon, Lockheed Martin, and 
Northrop Grumman. The second external threat is a potential loss of overmatch due to 
improved vehicle protection technology developed by near-peer competitor nations. 
It was mentioned in the internal organizational weaknesses section that the Javelin 
program does not appear to be making an effort to expand opportunities to small 
businesses. The external environment may be a contributor to this problem. The Javelin is 
a technologically advanced anti-tank system and requires a level of expertise and 
infrastructure that many small businesses may not have. It should be noted that Lockheed 
Martin did commit $4.4 billion in sales to around 9,000 small businesses in 2017 
(Lockheed Martin, 2018). It would appear that large industry has taken some efforts to 
increase small business opportunities. BBP sees the increase of small business 
opportunities as an important part of increasing acquisition buying power. The lack of 
small businesses in this marketplace may be an external threat to the Javelin program’s 
ability to satisfy our BBP best practices. 
The second external threat to the Javelin Program being able to adhere to BBP 
mandates is the improvement of near-peer competitor nation’s armor and anti-tank 
countermeasures. The newest iteration of BBP mandates that dominant capabilities are 
achieved while life cycle costs are controlled. Improved foreign anti-tank countermeasures 
such as the Russia Relikt ERA system may negate the Javelin’s current effectiveness. 
E. SECONDARY RESEARCH FINDINGS 
The main lesson learned for the acquisition workforce is that our current BBP best 
practices when implemented do provide real-world benefits. Directives coming from the 
top of a workplace hierarchy may not immediately resonate with the subordinate workforce 
without sufficient evidence of effectiveness. This project tested the real-world applicability 
of the BBP mandates. From the findings in this report it appears that the Javelin program 
implemented effective PBL as mandated by the BBP. The effective implementation of 
PBL, as mandated, resulted in real measurable improvements to operational readiness 
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while at the same time reducing costs. The frequency of the Javelin’s FMS demonstrates 
to the acquisition workforce how important it is for programs to design exportability into 
systems and to take advantage of global partnerships. The research results of this project 
reinforced the importance of our current BBP best practices. 
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V. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The Better Buying Power initiative began a process of continuing reexamination 
and improvement in the defense acquisition community. The BBP introduction had been 
the first large scale effort in recent history to reform the procurement process. BBP 2.0 
expanded on this effort with more refined focus areas and specific initiatives. The years of 
implementation and data collection gave way to BBP 3.0. The third iteration of the Better 
Buying Power plan maintained the core goals of BBP but somewhat shifted the focus to 
the outside environment; to the capabilities of near-peer competitor nations and the United 
States’ ability to achieve overmatch. 
This report conducted a SWOT analysis to address the primary research questions 
which is how well the Javelin program has adhered to our current BBP initiatives. It was 
found that the Javelin program’s internal strength was its highly successful implementation 
of PBL. An internal weakness is its overdependence on large contractors, instead of 
increasing opportunities for small businesses. The current environment has provided the 
opportunity for FMS and the Javelin’s exportability has been able to take great advantage 
of it. The current outside environment threatens the Javelin program with a marketplace 
lacking in competitive small businesses which hampers effective competition. The current 
environment has seen increasingly effective countermeasures on near-peer competitor 
nation armored vehicles. This threatens the Javelin’s overmatch capabilities. 
This JAP “tested” our abstract acquisition ideals of the BBP on past real-world 
acquisition history. It is recommended that future researchers examine other legacy 
acquisition programs. It would be best to examine programs that have been fielded and 
where research material is both copious and accessible. This method of defense program 
analysis may be used by NPS students and acquisition workforce members to strengthen 
their knowledge about other programs. This project was educational but limited by being 
dependent on only publicly released information. A future project with access to classified 
information about a subject defense program may yield a more thorough analysis. 
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